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A NOTE ON CORPORATE AMERICA 
Simon M. Lorne* 
THE ATIACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES 
SoURCEBOOK. Edited by M. Bruce Johnson. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 1978. Pp. xv, 348. $14.50. 
The first copy of The Attack on Corporate America that I 
received was sent to me by a former teaching colleague who com-
mented in his transmittal letter that "considering its source [The 
Law and Economics Center of the University of Miami School of 
Law] [it] is likely to be a hymn of praise to the free enterprise 
system." My colleague was right ... and wrong. Considering its 
source it was likely to be a hymn of praise. And, indeed, its sixty-
one essays are in large part, if not unanimously, in praise of the 
free enterprise system. However, when sixty-one essays occupy 
299 pages of text (my pocket calculator advises that the average 
is 4.9 pages per essay), it is difficult fairly to characterize the 
result as a "hymn." When the four major headings are 
"Sociopolitical Analogies and the Corporation," "Control of the 
Corporation," "State Versus Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions," and "Corporate Power and the Market," any such charac-
terization becomes most implausible. 
It appears, then, on its face (and the appearance is thor-
oughly substantiated by the contents) that the volume is too 
broad in scope, and the individual essays too abbreviated, for the 
book successfully to accomplish the mission that I would design 
for it. To say that, however, may not be to level any great criti-
cism at the work. For its mission may not be that which I would 
design, and it does not advertise itself as anything more (although 
certainly nothing less) than "The Corporate Issues Sourcebook." 
And to some substantial extent, it may be that it does an ade-
quate job of providing a source from which one can discern a 
variety of corporate issues. But it strains credulity to suggest that 
the sole raison d'etre of this work is providing a shopping list of 
issues. And, indeed, Henry Manne, founder and director of The 
Law and Economics Center, suggests in his preface that more is 
intended: "Many persons studying this work will be surprised to 
learn that the weight of high-grade scholarship about the modern 
corporate system supports strongly the conclusion that unregu-
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lated corporate capitalism functions far more desirably than var-
ious louder voices have led us to believe." That banner is carried 
throughout the work. Unfortunately, Professor Manne is guilty 
once again of overstatement. It is a shame that one who brings 
as much innovative and provocative thought as does Professor 
Manne to the field of corporate and securities regulation tends so 
often to reduce his arguments to political, if not actual, absurd-
ity, and to continue to defend them. 
"Many persons studying this work. . . " Unlikely. Some, no 
doubt, will study it. Many, I hope, will use it and consult it. But 
that many will study it is simply not to be expected. And if they 
did-without undertaking considerable additional effort to read 
much more broadly-they would no doubt be frustrated by the 
results of their efforts. How does one "study" a group of sixty-one 
five-page essays? 
". . . will be surprised. . . " Even less likely. The level of 
commitment required to "study" this volume-if it can be done 
-is such that only those who are already dedicated to the con-
clusions may be capable of accomplishing it. It would be aston-
ishing if those few individuals were to be surprised. 
". . . to learn that the weight of high-grade scholarship 
about the modern corporate system . .. "Impossible. Some of the 
sixty-one essays are excellent. Some are not. But they are cer-
tainly not, as a group, capable of conveying to the reader any 
clear notion of what "the weight of high-grade scholarship" truly 
holds. I tend to believe the premise of Professor Manne's preface. 
I have a great deal of faith in the social efficiency of capitalism. I 
even think myself capable of "high-grade" scholarship. Yet even 
I could not fairly draw conclusions from this book as to what a 
large group-much less the weight-of high-grade scholars would 
conclude. Furthermore, the book does not purport to be a dia-
logue that would expose the thoughts of both sides. It is rather 
in the nature of rebuttal, and to draw firm conclusions from it 
would be both difficult and dangerous. 
". . . supports strongly the conclusion. . . " See supra, but 
read it with even more emphasis. 
". . . that unregulated corporate capitalism functions. . . " 
No such tenet is put forth in any of the essays, nor should it be. 
We have never seen unregulated corporate capitalism. Indeed, it 
may be that the essence of incorporation-made possible only by 
enabling legislation-implies regulation. Whether or not that is 
true, it is certainly true that we have never experienced unregu-
lated corporations, for the world's attraction to economic regula-
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tion predates the wide-spread use of the corporate format. And 
it is difficult to imagine the existence of unregulated corporate 
capitalism in the modern environment. 
". . . far more desirably than various louder voices have led 
us to believe." Possible, assuming the editorial "us" is in 
use-certainly those louder voices have seldom led Professor 
Manne to believe very much. Even with that assumption, how-
ever, and even combining the last two quoted phrases for fair-
ness's sake, one could not fairly conclude so much from this vol-
ume. The broadest legitimate conclusion is that the views of the 
louder voices are not likely to be true, and that some less, or 
different, regulation than we now have would be beneficial. 
This book does fulfill a function. It does present a point of 
view that has too often been ignored. It does provide a forum for 
sensible views. But its reach exceeds its grasp by too much. To 
respond in such a relatively short book to an attack as widespread 
as that on the modern corporation is impossible. No matter how 
concisely written, it is difficult for five pages to respond to fifty, 
much less five hundred or five thousand. Time and again, the 
reader's response-even when the reader is already a true believer 
(as I am)-is more likely to be "Good point!" or "Interesting!" 
than "Q.E.D." 
As one who has at times been rash enough to suggest that 
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" was indeed, and even is, a useful 
basis for analysis, rather than a silly historical eccentricity which 
economic history survived, perhaps I should not be heard to criti-
cize any attempt to give greater credence to views with which I 
fundamentally agree. But even I-perhaps because I was reading 
the book rather than using it as a source book-found myself 
bored well short of its end. The various essays are each titled with 
a question. (E.g., "Does advertising persuade consumers to buy 
things they do not need?" [no], "Is corporate executive compen-
sation excessive?" [no], "Does antitrust activity increase eco-
nomic welfare?" [no], etc.) The answers to the questions posed 
are overwhelmingly, if not universally, in the negative. And after 
not very long one becomes tired, no matter how strong one's ini-
tial allegiance, of five-page essays advising that government in-
volvement is bad, and that present corporate activity is good, 
acceptable, beneficial, and quite possibly beyond reproach. 
Indeed, the reaction of even this reader was to begin to focus 
upon the areas in which modern corporate behavior is at fault, if 
not to sympathize with the "louder voices" to which Professor 
Manne referred. It seems entirely plausible that within the con-
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fines of what I would call strict conservatism one might disagree 
with much of the underlying theme of the volume. For example, 
to the extent that the essays in the book deal with the environ-
ment, they tend to suggest that attempts by the government to 
force corporations to confine environmental pollution are wrong 
because they will increase prices, destroy jobs, and so on (al-
though, again, some of the better essays do refrain from that sort 
of excess). However, it strikes me as fully within the dogma to 
suggest (as these better essays do) that if a particular method of 
production creates external costs such as pollution, the market 
mechanism of capitalism can operate efficiently only if those 
costs are internalized, and the government must in all likelihood 
be used to accomplish that end. For example, in a purely theoreti-
cal system (thanks to the wonders of theory) one would suggest 
that if a method of production by manufacturer A creates pol-
lution causing X million dollars of damage annually, then the 
manufacturer should be taxed at X million dollars, with the pro-
ceeds used to compensate those who suffered from the pollution. 
Only in that way c.an manufacturer B, whose methods do not 
create such pollution, properly compete with manufacturer A, so 
that the marketplace can make the decision that self-interest 
properly requires (we embrace again Adam Smith). That is not, 
of course, to say that manufacturer A should be prohibited from 
polluting, for the citizenry may well prefer to suffer with the pol-
lution and effectively (as a result of the tax redistribution) ac-
quire the pollutant-causing products at a lower price. That 
remains a decision that is properly the citizens' to make and not 
the government's. Given the practical impossibility of measuring 
compensation, and of properly redistributing it, one might even 
argue reasonably about whether manufacturer A should be taxed 
in some estimated appropriate amount, or should rather be re-
quired to eliminate the pollution. However, the tendency of the 
essays in this book is simply to assert that there should be 
neither tax nor prohibition, with the implied result that manu-
facturers may properly obtain disproportionate benefits through 
being able to ignore social costs. 
Similar analyses can be made with respect to many of the 
topics covered in the book. Some of the essays are excellent, some 
shallow. Those which are excellent lead the reader to believe that 
with more development, with more examination, with more anal-
ysis, they could be conclusive. Unfortunately, few of them are 
given that essential development. And as the hearing officer ad-
vised opposing counsel in the first administrative hearing I ever 
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attended, "being able to prove it doesn't inspire me, Mr. Jones. 
If you can, please do so, forthwith." 
But the real flaw of this work is not so much in its predict-
ability as in its failure to examine in a constructive way the real 
and significant problems that do face modern American free en-
terprise. To my mind, the greatest of those is not unique to the 
private sector, but rather is one which besets all economic activ-
ity in this country at the present time, both private and public. 
It is simply this: While the theory of rational economic behavior 
depends in substantial part upon long-term rationality, our deci-
sions seem more and more often to be made on a short-term basis. 
While John Maynard Keynes's analyses of political economics 
have been vastly distorted-so that he seems to be in popular 
disrepute today for unfounded reasons fully as much as_ he was 
the hero of yesterday for equally unfounded reasons-we have 
accepted completely his recognition that "in the long run we are 
all dead," and we seem generally to have chosen not to let that 
frame of reference affect our decisions. 
That recognition is not, of course, novel: It may be traced 
directly from the pioneering work of Berle and Means, 1 and their 
recognition (even forty years ago) that modern corporations are 
typically controlled by managers rather than by owners. What is, 
perhaps, if not new, then at least rather more pressingly impor-
tant than it has been, is the recognition that we are critically in 
need of long-run decision-making, yet incredibly unable to obtain 
it. In part, that is no doubt a result of the increasing impact of 
short-run government decisions on corporate behavior. 
An aspect of the labor relations field provides an obvious 
example. It is not at all difficult to understand why a succession 
of mayors in New York, seeking reelection and needing to please 
the electorate immediately, compromised the future while quell-
ing the immediate unrest by agreeing with labor unions to provide 
pension benefits that were clearly beyond the City's means (at 
least in combination with the City's other well-intentioned but 
perhaps excessive social programs). We all know what happened 
to New York,2 and in the publicity that followed its near collapses 
in the 1974-1978 period, we became aware that New York was far 
from alone in its unfunded pension schemes. The City of Los 
Angeles is thought to be in reasonable fiscal health, as large mu-
1. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PR!vATE PROPERTY (1933). 
2. See generally SEC, STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK (1977). 
548 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:543 
nicipalities go, but even it is reported to have unfunded pension 
liabilities in the billions of dollars. 
With some, but considerably less, publicity, much the same 
thing has happened to our corporations. Some two years ago 
Fortune magazine ran a most significant article discussing the 
unfunded future pension obligations of major corporations in this 
country.3 But while the SEC has since then become embroiled in 
substantial controversy with the accounting profession regarding 
questions such as the capitalization of lease obligations and ac-
counting for inflation,4 relatively little attention (at least of the 
publicized sort) has been given to unfunded pension obligations 
or the assumptions on which they may be viewed as being 
funded.5 Yet surely such issues are worthy of our concern-unless 
they, like the prospect of nuclear war, are simply too great and 
fearsome to contemplate. 
Why has this state of affairs come to exist? The answer is 
simply this: that by and large, managers are scrutinized on the 
basis of current results. The strike that is not solved today is 
likely to have a far more meaningful impact on the executives 
responsible, on the way in which corporations are perceived by 
the stock market and the public, and on similar interests, than 
are future pension obligations which cannot or can scarcely be 
met. They are a problem to be solved by tomorrow's managers, 
who will have to worry at that time. 
While the short-run/long-run tradeoff may be most apparent 
in the context of labor strikes and pension benefits, the difficul-
ties seen in that context recur in a number of areas. In the public 
sector, of course, many of those systemic failures have been 
chronicled over the years-thousands of "pork barrel" projects, 
the failure to establish an energy policy that would prevent what 
is probably the too cheap distribution of oil and gas, and the like. 
All are the result of concern with short-run appearances, and with 
3. Ehrbar, Those Pension Plans Are Even Weaker Than You Think, FORTUNE, Nov. 
1977, at 104. 
4. See, e.g., Unaudited Replacement Cost Information-Replacement Cost lnforma• 
tion Required in Filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Statement 
on Auditing Standard No. 18 (May 1977); Lease Accounting and Disclosure Rules, SEC 
Accounting Series Release No. 225, (Aug. 31, 1977); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No, 
7 (May 23, 1976); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 9; SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin 
No. 10 (Aug. 1, 1976). 
5. The text no doubt overstates my case. The Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act, and its legislative history, give substantial attention to pension funding problems, 
However, that statute, and the related history, give relatively scant attention to the 
investor's need for information in the area. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1976). 
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reelection, that understandably, if not acceptably, outweighs 
concern with long-term consequences. 
In many instances the private sector is only slightly better. 
Private-sector managers-as opposed to owners-tend also to 
devote their primary attention to the problems of today, those 
that will affect this year's bonus and next year's promotion. The 
rush of the late 1960s toward conglomeration on the basis of the 
modern Adam Smith's "super money"6-paper stock certifi-
cates-is an example. How many senseless combinations were 
made in that era on a foundation of nothing but mutual 
greed-the greed of buyers to acquire, through the wonders of 
accounting, 7 "instant earnings," and the greed of sellers to dis-
pose of their companies for paper certificates supposedly repre-
senting far more than the worth of the company? The rush of 
failures and disposals that followed gives clear witness to that 
greed. Certainly, some acquisitions of that period were, or became 
by chance, mutually profitable. But countless others were fool-
hardy rushes to obtain today's paper fortune, mindless of tomor-
row's reality. 
This is not a sensible state of affairs and is probably a far 
more meaningful and legitimate problem than many of those 
discussed in the book. Yet it would not be in keeping with the 
theory of the book to assess such problems, for they suggest that 
all is not right with free enterprise today and that there may be 
a proper role for someone, somehow to play. 
I do not have, at least in these brief pages, a solution to the 
problem. Nor do I expect that my raising it in this context will 
cause the attention to be given to it that is required. However, 
the dimensions of the problem should trouble us all. Our whole 
society has become oriented toward this day's results, this day's 
profits-and. the long term has become coincident with that re-
quired by the Internal Revenue Code for long-term capital gains. 
By and large (with some notable exceptions), decisions regarding 
environmental matters, hiring policies, accounting practices, and 
the like focus upon the short term. 
There are, of course, some bright lights upon the horizon. 
The development of the employee stock-ownership plan, if used 
seriously as a means of retirement planning, may significantly tie 
the future compensation of today's managers to the future success 
of the enterprise. It is an attempt to make managers again into 
6. 'A. SMITH,' SuPERMONEY (1972). See also J. BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS (1973). 
7. See A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972). 
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owners. However, while I am not aware of any statistical exami-
nation, I would hazard a guess that such plans are of importance 
only with respect to a minor part of the economic power of this 
country. 
Increased attention to the role of the board of directors, with 
a shift toward independent directors, 8 is probably a more mean-
ingful recent phenomenon. That body, to the extent that it ac-
tually controls the corporation, may serve to inject into decision-
making processes the needed attention to long-run concerns. The 
importance of that relatively recent development-which was in 
large measure the result of government prodding-will be seen 
only in the future. 
Perhaps it is inappropriate to criticize the particular work 
under scrutiny for failing to examine realistically some of the 
serious problems of free enterprise in this country. Perhaps this 
volume does perform a useful service in providing a background 
of readings sympathetic to free enterprise, and in opposing the 
"louder voices" to which its preface refers. But works of this type, 
no less than works of the Nader variety, tend toward a polariza-
tion that is neither helpful nor enlightening. At a conference in 
San Diego in January 1979, Professor (presently General Counsel 
to the Treasury Department) Robert H. Mundheim presented an 
important response to modern concerns with foreign payments 
"scandals" and many recent "corporate governance" issues. He 
warned that while there have been some serious abuses, and that 
they certainly need correction, it may be error to give too much 
attention to a "B-" on the "conduct and deportment" side of the 
report card and to ignore the "A's" that our corporations have 
achieved in arithmetic, english, and history. That sort of criti-
cism-that search for balance and recognition of the value of the 
modern corporation-is needed and useful. Too often this volume 
tends to ignore balance and to react blindly to critics. 
Henry Manne's Center undoubtedly fulfills an important 
function in educating those trained in the law to the world of 
economics and in presenting, typically, the view of the loyal mi-
nority. There is no doubt but that it, like this product of the 
Center, is a useful and important force. I, however, for one, hope 
that it will become more of a positive force toward seeking ra-
8. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the ratio of "outside" to "inside" 
directors at industrial concerns is now 60-40. Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1979 at 1, col. 
5 (Western ed.). See generally Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: 
Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978). 
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tional solutions to the problems that free enterprise does face, and 
that it will candidly recognize those problems, rather than being 
merely the voice of opposition. 
